This paper studies the evolution of interethnic attitudes, the integration or segregation dynamics of ethnic minorities and the conditions for the rising of ethnic-based social hierarchies. By means of a cultural evolution framework, a dynamics of interethnic attitudes is provided and conditions for their convergence derived. Steady states implying a constant role of racism and no role for racism are identified. Deriving sufficient conditions for convergence, we find that the way in which Oblique Socialization Schemes (the way children react to out-of-family stimuli when forming their cultural values) are defined and modelled becomes crucial for the structure of the derived long run equilibria. In particular, we find that Steady States implying an Ethnic-based social ranking or full integration of ethnicities may be reached depending on whether or not agents use Reciprocity and/or Ethnocentrism in their interethnic attitudes formation schemes. Allowing different groups for asymmetric use of reciprocity and Ethnocentrism, we explain why different ethnic minorities may show different integration patterns, and what are the different roles (Cultural bridge, cultural hub) an ethnic group may play in the integration process. Moreover, in this way, we explain why attitudes of some groups towards others converge to the same values, while other groups seems to be excluded from this process. At last, we provide the first steps for the endogeneization of socialization structures.
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Introduction

1
Interactions among different ethnicities in modern societies have always been a great concern for many academics and politicians. The United States has been the first country to experience problems with interracial relationships, since the american society has always been composed by people of different ethnicities. Now Europe is also starting to encounter problems and opportunities deriving from a multicultural and multiethnic society. Moreover, given the actual rates of immigration, we can reasonably think that these issues will become increasingly important for the Western societies. Thus, this paper studies the evolution of interethnic attitudes, the integration or segregation dynamics of ethnic minorities and the conditions for the rising of ethnic-based social hierarchies by means of a cultural evolution framework. Events as the banlieue riots in Paris in 2005 or the more recent election of Barack Obama as president of the United States, reopened a strong debte about integration of minorities: how much they get integrated in the society or how much they resist to integration in order to preserve their identity. Moreover, anti-immigrant political parties in some European countries such as Austria, the Netherlands or Italy rised the problem of native people worrying for their weaker position in the society with respect to some decades ago. Other policy issues are related with ethnic and racial discrimination: for example the debate about the Affirmative Actions that favours some minorities in the access to jobs and schools rises some legal problems and debates among law scholars (for a review, Casadei and Re (2007) ) with the emergence of new directions in legal studies as with the Critical Race Theory (Thomas and Zanetti (2005) ), thus stressing the cultural origin of race and ethnic categorizations. Again, security practices as the Racial Profiling Techiques in order to discriminate potentially dangerous agents, selecting people to be controlled on the basis of race, rises lots of concernes, especially now that these techniques are used after the 9/11 (for a review, Goldoni (2007) ). Even before 9/11 this was a procedure used in some security controls: for example black people complained that police agents stopped many black male drivers without any evident justification but race, ironically saying that the police stopped the person because he was 'driving while black'. Consequently, as it is clear, understanding better the mechanisms that govern these racial dynamics may thus be crucial in the promotion of policies for integration. Studies in sociology, anthropology and social psychology produced an incredible amount of case studies trying to understand where and why integration or segregation phenomena may happen, especially regarding school and marital situations. Lot of works regard the Unites States because of availability of data and, especially, because the interethnicity of the society is an historically rooted phenomenon. Many studies focus on blacks as McAdoo (2006) : it is one of the most interesting interdisciplinary works on this issue, since it brings together the experience of people working on the field as sociologists, pshycologists or even therapists in order to study the integration/segregation forces in afro-american families. Also Ogbu (1990) studied this problem focusing on how new generations are socialized with respect to their socio-economical situation and the history of their own comunity, thus providing useful insights on how socialization schemes work. This study also pro-vides an useful categorization of minorities regarding their history, and thus focusing on the causal link between group history and the socialization mechanisms they adopt. Evidence from other minorities such as Hispanics, Asians and Cubans (as in Masuoka (2006) and Arias (2001) ) or European immigrants communities (as, for the case of Italians, in Form (2000) ) has been deeply studied, particularly focusing on the fact that european minorities usually experienced a faster integration that other non-european minorities as Hispanics or Blacks.
More recently some sociological studies find the existence of an ethnic hierarchy in the society, meaning that the society converges to an agreement over attitutes towards the ethnic groups. From an empirical point of view, this intergroup consensus over ethnic hierarchies has been studied for US (Bobo and Zubrinsky (1996) ; Duckitt (1992) ), Canada (Berry and Kalin (1979, 1996) ), Sweden (Snellman and Ekehammar (2005) ), the Netherlands (Verkuyten and Kinket (2000) ), as pointed out by Listhaug and Strabac (2008) that provide the same evidence for Muslim minorities. From a theoretical point of view Hagendoorn et al. (1995) explain why we observe ethnic hierarchies: this literature identifies the causes of this evolution of hierarchy in the process of prejudice formation, in a form of cultural distance among groups and in the socio-economic status of the group. This kind of studies try to understand why, in a society, a rank of the different ethnic groups could be observed so that a sort of agreement on most preferrable ethncities arises. These works rise important questions about the long run role of racism: is the ethnic social ranking we observe stable enough for ethnicity to always play a role in people' choices? Or under which conditions ethnic groups may agree on common attitudes towards anyother such that an 'end of racism' may be observed? Even though some theoretical economic literature uses network theory in order to understand segregation and its determinants (Jackson (2006) and Currarini et al. (2009) ), here we focus on a second line of research: cultural evolution. Cultural evolution theories have their roots in the seminal work of Feldman (1973, 1981) and Richerson (1985, 2005) . These theories develop theoretical models trying to capture the dynamics involved in the evolution of a given cultural trait. They are based on the intergenerational transmission and modification of some characters having as peculiar element the coevolution of biological and cultural traits. These models, originally developed by anthropologists and genetists, had recently been applied by economists in order to explain marriage choices in diverse societies. We use these theories since they provide instruments to analyse how values are formed, and how they may spread in the society, taking care of the interaction between this process and the environment in which the agents live: we think that these are key elements in the study of a social phenomenon as the evolution of interethnic attitudes. Moreover, given the fact that attitudes may be transmitted from one person to the other through a kind of imitation, and, thus, they are susceptible of modification, they can be considered as cultural traits without problems. The first works trying to introduce these concepts in the economic debate has been Verdier (2000, 2001) in which the transmission of a cultural trait is modelled, and the dynamics of groups population is analyzed. In particular agents in these models are allowed to socialize their children to their cultural trait. These works represents the starting point to understand different phenomena about interethnic and religious intermarriage using random search models. The most interesting contributions are Bisin et al. (2004 Bisin et al. ( , 2006 in which models for religious intermarriages in the US and interethnic preferences in UK are set up. In particular, in Bisin et al. (2004) this model was used in order to estimate the intensity of ethnic identities depending on the social context children are rised. In these last contributions, however, the cultural traits that are transmitted from one generation to the other, are fixed, so that only an analysis of the demographic trends is possible. Smirnov (2007, 2008) and Pichler (2008) start to introduce the possibility of a change in the intensity of the cultural traits. The first contributions provides some sufficient conditions for convergence to a Melting Pot equilibrium, even though it does not provide a theoretical model in which this cultural dynamcs happens; the second one uses the Bisin-Verdier framework to introduce convergence to a melting pot equilibrium. They define a Melting Pot equilibrium a steady state in which all the cultural traits converges to the same value.
This paper goes a little bit further in the analysis. We define as 'integration' the process under which two ethnic groups share the same attitudes towards any ethnic group, and 'segregation' when this does not happen, and differences in attitudes are observed: in our case integration does not mean that two groups have good attitude towards each other, but just that their attitude vector is equal so that their cultural traits are identical. Moreover, we consider fixed ethnicities, so that we are not interested in how and if a melting pot society or mixed identities arise, but only under which conditions different cultural groups converge in attitudes still remaining distingushed. We use, as starting point, the Bisin-Verdier framework in which agents choose how much to socialize children. However, differently from these previous studies, we consider two cultural traits that are contemporarily involved in the dynamics: 'ethnicity' and 'attitudes' towards other ethnic groups. Since cultural evolution regards interaction between biological and cultural traits, in our study ethnicity is biologically determined and thus fixed but transmittable, while attitudes are culturally derived and thus are transmitted and changed in the socialization process, so that they are no more fixed. Given this framewok we then consider what is said by Boyd and Richerson (1985) in the first pages of their first contribution to cultural evolution theories in which they argue that a theory for cultural evolution 'should predict the effect of different structures of cultural transmission on the evolutionary process'. In particular, starting from different schemes of cultural transmission, we derive conditions under which ethnic social rankings, as previously defined, arise in the long run, and when attitudes converge to the same value, thus having a kind of 'end of racism', providing theoretical answers to these sociological questions, and also understanding when racism may be endogenous in these cultural dynamics. Consequently, we explain ethnic social hierarchies by using the first factor Hagerdoorn et al. (1998) uses: prjudice formation. In order to understand these dynamics, we study deeper a key element of cultural evolution theories: the socialization mechanism. In particular, depending on how children react to out of family stimuli (Oblique Socialization), the integration/segregation result may change. Moreover we provide an analysis of what happens if groups differ in the use of oblique socialization schemes and derive conditions over the interethnic relational structures in order to get again ethnic hierarchies or a deeper integration. In all these cases, we underline the roles that a group may play in the intergroup relationships (cultural bridges or cultural hub) and the role of particular socialization schemes (reciprocity and ethnocentrism) understaning their impact on the long run outcome. We then use this simplified framework in order to understand better what happened in the integration of european and black miorities in the US. Using a minorities categorization provided by Ogbu (1990) , we try to give reason of the fact that europeans integrated almost perfectly in the society and blacks experienced much more difficulties. Again the key element for this explanation is how Oblique Socialization affect the cultural transmission process. As a last point, we provide a first insight for time-dependent socialization schemes, focusing on some conditions for convergence to long-run equilibria, thus opening a road towards the endogeneization of socialization mechanisms.
The rest of the paper has the following structure: in section 2 we describe the model, in section 3 we provide a general dynamics for cultural traits studying conditions for convergence. Section 4 introduces the oblique socialization structures, while section 5 studies what happens if different groups uses different socialization structures. Section 6 introduces time-dependent oblique socialization structures. Section 7 ends the paper.
The Model
Consider a population composed of infinitely many agents. Every agent is characterized by the ethnicity, so that we can identify n ethnic subpopulations on the set V ≡ {i, j, k, ...n}.
All the agents of a given ethnicity are supposed to be equal. Agents of a given ethnicity i are also characterized by a vector V i t ∈ [0, 1] n , that we call 'type', such that every entry is a coefficient associated to an ethnic group. Below an example for a 4 ethnicities world.
All agents belonging to the same ethnic group have the same type. This vector is supposed to be observable and common knowledge. The element on the j th position, for example V ij t , represents the attitude i agents have towards j agents. This may be seen as an objective index that measures the prejudice or tolerance each ethnic group has towards any other. Examples of this measures are the ones by Golebiowska (2007) in which measures of reciprocal tolerance are derived by opinion surveys focusing on interpersonal trust and other social indicators. Other examples are derived by ethnic hierarchies studies in the social psychology field, as Hagendoorn et al.(1998) , Listhaug and Strabac (2008) , Berry (2006) and Schalksoekar et al. (2004) , in which indexes that indicate the attitudes among groups are estimated so that an overview on how ethnic hierarchies may arise is given. This will be important in the next sections since we will consider the insurgence of ethnic hierarchies as a possible long run equilibrium of the society. Such studies become now much more easier by means of surveys as the World Value Survey or the International Study of Attitudes Towards Immigration and Settlement (ISATIS) , that make the objectivation of these measures possible. A theoretical paper studying how these prejudices exist and are transmitted is given by Bar-Tal (1997) , in which the roles of context, socialization and individual variables are examined. Another set of studies that uses these indexes are derived from the Bogardus Social Distance Scale (Bogardus (1926 (Bogardus ( , 1959 ). These studies, mainly referred to social psychology and psychometric techniques and developed in Hraba et al. (1999) , Randall and Delbridge (2005) , Lee et al. (1996) and Parillo and Donoghue(2005) , estimate, by means of scaling systems, social dystance measures and indicators of how much groups reciprocally like. In this way the measure of how much each group is tolerant towards any other, or has prejudice towards the others, is rendered objective and can be thought as known by every member that constantly lives in the society and interact daily with all the other members. Thus this measure, since is derived from all the interactions that happen in the society, is considered as common knowledge. Given these priors, the structure of the model is the following: every agent, at time t, reproduces asexually, so that a child is born from every agent. The child has the same ethnicity of the parent, but has no 'type' formed yet 2 . Thus, the parent produces a socialization effort τ i t in order to influence the child type. In particular, the parents would like to perfectly transmit their type to children, otherwise they experience a loss. However, socialization is costly. The child type then is formed considering the effect of the parental (or Vertical) socialization, and the societal (or Oblique) socialization. Oblique Socialization, in particular, is how other adults with well formed types influence the children' socialization process. After this socialization process has taken place, children become adults with defined types, can reproduce and start again the socialization of their children. Thus a dynamics of cultural traits is endogenously derived.
Parents try to transmit to their children their own type by producing a socialization effort: call τ i t ∈ [0, 1] the effort parents i produce at time t in the Vertical Socialization. Children type will thus be given by Vertical and Oblique Socialization forces following the standard rules of socialization, as derived from cultural evolution literature:
withV ij ∈ [0, 1] being the effect of the Oblique Socialization process on the j th element of i agents belonging to t + 1 generation. We call this a Cavalli-Sforza Socialization Dynamics. 
It simply states that if the child has the same values in all the type vector entries as the parent, then the parent has the highest possible utility from the child, V * . Otherwise, he additionally experiences a loss dependent on the difference of the values. The parent also experiences a cost c(τ i t ) for the effort produced. Consequently each parent will face the following
2 , thus representing the difference between the effect of oblique socialization over all type entries and parents type and being a general measure of the parent's loss. Substitute the (1) into (2) and we get that the parent wants to maximize
Thus the role of τ i t is here more evident: the higher the effort, the lower the general loss of the parent, but the higher the cost associated with this effort. Moreover, unless ∆V i t = 0, the marginal utility of τ i t , which is equal to 2(1 − τ i t )∆V i t , is positive and decreasing at a constant rate and is zero at maximum socialization effort. Then, Assumption 1: Assume that the socialization cost function has the following properties:
We can now state the following:
] exists and is unique ∀t, i. Moreover if V ij t =V ij for at least one j, then τ i * t ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix C.
Assumption 1 states that costs should be flat at zero socialization and have positive slope elsewhere. This not very demanding assumption ensures the formation of an internal optimal socialization effort. This result is supported from the evidence that both society and parents actually enter in the children socialization process and influence his values. Only if V ij t =V ij t then the family and the society have the same effect on the children' type so that, being the socialization costly, parents choose not to socialize children, since what children can take from the society is the same they can transmit to the offpring so that no incentives for vertical socialization is present. The society we describe here is very conservative in the sense that no agent has utility derived from diversity, but everyone would like to have children with his own very same 6 preferences. An usual explanation for this is that parents judge their offpring by means of their preferences so that they use what is called 'imperfect empathy' (Bisin and Verdier (2000) ); we will maintain this behavioural assumption along all this work.
It has to be noted that these standard assumptions over socialization schemes imply that, since parents know the exact outcome of Oblique Socialization, then they can fully determine their children type and they are sure that their actions maximize their ex-ante and ex-post utilities. Moreover, in this simplified framework, children have only a passive role. Even though simplificative, for the time being we take these assumptions as true, just recalling the limits of this view since, in reality, children actually play an active role in their socialization process and there is also an element of uncertainty in oblique socialization that parents cannot control for, so that oblique socialization is subjected to a form of ambiguity or, at least, of randomness.
Cultural Dynamics
We have seen in equation (1) that the dynamics of the cultural traits crucially depends on how oblique socialization is defined since, depending on it, parents experiences different losses and thus may choose different socialization efforts. In particular we referred with V ij to the generic oblique socialization effect on the element V ij t+1 . We analyse here this element. The simplest way in order to intend oblique transmission of a cultural trait is taking the social average for that trait. This imply that the child randomly meets agents belonging to the parents' generation in the society and thus takes the average value from these encounters (for example teachers or other cultural models in the society). Equation (1) will thus become:
This can represent the most frictionless society we can imagine. For example the case in which children live in a neighborhood with no biases in group shares, or attend schools with professor of different ethnic groups in quota proportional to the population shares in the overall society or ethnic messages are reported by media respecting the proportions of ethnicities in the society. Moreover, unless τ i t = 1, so that parents produce an enormous socialization effort (but impossible under Assumption 1), it is impossible to have any V ij t fixed. This structure, then, restricts the possible influences of the Oblique Socialization since it is not possible that in the V ij t+1 formulation process, i agents take care of the V kw t value, and it restricts the possible weights assigned to the different traits, fixing them equal to the population shares vector. We thus propose a more general formulation for the socialization dynamic:
in which w kw t,ij is a parameter, that for the time being we consider exogenous, simply stating if the agent consider the V kw t in the V ij dynamic. This could be a measure of similarity of situations, of trust or other factors that could also be proportional to the population size of k: we generally call it 'relevance parameter '. Given that these are weights, we have 0 ≤ w kw t,ij ≤ 1 ∀i, j, k, w and k,w w kw t,ij = 1.
The matrix of these parameters for each ethnic group gives a full characterization of the oblique socialization technology at any time t. In order to keep the model as simple as possible, for the time being we consider weights that are not time dependent so that the equation (5) becomes:
We call this cultural dynamics a Generalized Cavalli-Sforza Socialization Dynamics. This may be a first approximation of reality if population shares do not change during time or if the strucutre of the society (schools, neighborhoods, for example) are almost stable in time.
In order to choose an optimal socialization effort, the parents should know the weights vector their children are going to use in the oblique socialization effort and thus get a precise computation of all the social influences they get. Given this we can state the following:
Proposition 2. If Assumption 1 holds, then any Generalized Cavalli-Sforza Socialization Dynamics converges to a steady state.
This proposition basically states that if socialization is such that parents always have incentive to socialize their children at least a little bit, then convergence towards a steady state happens. Thus, the role of vertical socialization is to ensure convergence since, if for any reason τ = 0 out of equilibrium, convergence may not happens and cycles may arise. Proposition 2 does not say which kind of steady state is reached and thus leaves the door open to different equilibria implying different levels of integration or segregation: this will be the topic of the next sections. From a technical point of view proposition 2 also generalizes the contributions of Smirnov (2007, 2008) and Pichler (2008) since here we control for parents' socializing role and for a wider range of possible interaction among ethnic groups, not restricting to the cases in which the matrix of relevance parameters forms irreducible matrices or block diagonal irreducible matrices, thus providing a more general sufficient condition for convergence. When, in section 6, we analyse time dependent weights, the generalization of previous theorems is more complete. At steady state it happens that τ i * t = 0. By the definition of steady state
, ∀i, j, t so that parents and sons always have the same type. Consequently there is no incentive to socialize children since the loss the parents experience is zero. This implies that, in the 8 long run, parents would not have any role in the socialization: since they care only about having children similar to them, once that this is an outcome of oblique socialization, they do not care anymore about it. Remark: In the proof of proposition 2 we also show that even for the case of suboptimal socialization efforts, if τ i t , ∀i is strictly positive, convergence happens, even though steady state values may be different from the case in which the optimal τ i * t is chosen. Now, as we have argued above, in order to choose an optimal socialization effort the parent should know the whole matrix of all attitudes V , and the vector of weightsw his son is going to use in the oblique socialization process. While the first assumption may be reasonable since the matrix of V is common knowledged, the second one may be questioned, since oblique socialization influences may not be perfectly predicted by parents. Still, even if the parent has a wrong guess of the relevance parameters, and thus choose an ex-post suboptimal socialization effort, if the chosen τ ∈ (0, 1], then convergence happens. From a mathematical point of view, τ i t > 0, ∀i make the diagonal entries of the transmission matrix A strictly positive. Thus, the matrix A, or its diagonal blocks, if irreducible, are also acyclic. However, it is not necessary to have τ i t > 0 in order to have acyclic matrix, since an acyclic matrix may also derive from some particular structures of oblique socialization. However, since we have not put constraints on the oblique socialization scheme, τ i t > 0 ensures acyclic matrix. This will become clear with the next sections. Then, far from being useless, different level of vertical socialization have effect on the levels of the steady state. Morevoer, the introduction of the optimal socialization effort makes the model richer, such that it will be useful in policy and welfare analysis. Ongoing research is actually focused on these last issues.
Oblique Socialization Schemes and Evolution
Socialization Schemes
In the last section we proved that convergence to a steady state happens under some weak conditions. However, a crucial element of cultural dynamics is how children are influenced during their Oblique Socialization. As Boyd and Richerson (1985) explain in the first pages of their contribution to cultural evolution studies, 'the theory should predict the effect of different structures of cultural transmission on the evolutionary process'. In our case a structure of cultural transmission in characterized by the structure of the relevance parameters matrix. Any vector of these parameters identifies an Oblique Socialization Scheme. In order to follow the Boyd-Richerson approach, starting from simple socialization schemes we now derive long run equilibria that can be considered sensitive in the study of integration and segregation of groups, so that an analysis of how different socialization structures influence the process is the key element of the rest of the paper. We find reasonable that, while forming their attitudes towards other groups, agents may use two basic schemes: Reciprocity and Ethnocentrism. With the first one we mean that people tend to form bad (good) attitudes towards people that have a bad (good) attitude towards them. With the second one we mean the possibility that a group have a good attitude towards people of the same ethnic group and never question this attitude.
Looking at studies in sociology and social psychology it can also be found (Berry (2006) and Berry and Kalin (1979, 1996) , for example) that agents actually use Reciprocity and Ethnocentrism in their attitude formation schemes. In particular, the correlation between inter-group attitudes has been computed and has been found positive so that Reciprocity seems to be an actual way of attitude formation; on the other side ethnocentrism has been proved to exists in all cases even though with different intensities depending on the ethnic group. In terms of our model, Reciprocity means that w ji ij > 0, so that V ji t enters in the formation of V ij t+1 , and if j has a bad (or good) attitude towards i, then i children take this into account while forming their attitudes. With Ethnocentrism we mean that agents do not question the reflexive attitudes, so that
. We thus build 4 general socialization schemes in which there can be no reciprocity and no ethnocentrism, or one of the two or both. With respect to the equation (5) the following schemes are restrictions of the most general case since we impose particular structures on the relevance parameters matrix. Thus:
• Ethnocentrism Rule an oblique socialization rule in which (w kw ij = 0, ∀w = j, w
• Reciprocity Rule an oblique socialization rule in which (w
• Reciprocity and Ethnocentrism Rule an oblique socialization rule in which (w
The first scheme has neither Reciprocity nor Ethnocentrism so that the attitude V ij t+1
depend on all the attitudes of everyone towards j. In this case, even though the weights may represents frictions in the ethnic relations, no intergroup relation or cross influence is inhibited. In the second case we introduce ethnocentrism so that V ii t = V ii t+1 . Since τ i t ∈ (0, 1) under Assumption 1, in order to have this we impose that w ii ii = 1, ∀i. In this case all the other V ij t , ∀i = j follow the previous rule. In the third case the reciprocity introducethe possibility of having w ji ij > 0 so that V ij t+1 depends on the attitudes towards j plus the attitude of j towards i. The fourth case just combines the previous two situations.
Steady State Characterization
In this subsection we focus on steady states, identifying 4 classes of them that may be considered benchmark outcomes of cultural dynamics: we consider them in relation to their integration or segregation properties. As previously argued, in some literature there has been found evidence of social hierarchies based on ethnicity: in particular agents seem to agree on a ranking of different ethnicities, so that common prejudices arise. In terms of our model, if a common hierarchy is shown, we have that lim
We call these kind of steady states Hierarchy Equilibria (HE). This situation may be represented by the following matrix in which every row is a type vector so that the ij entry is the V ij t .
Suppose for example that a > b > c > d then there is an intergroup consensus on the fact that i ethnic groups is the best ethnic groups since everyone has the best attitude towards it. On the reverse k agents has a bad attitude towards themselves too, and are also considered the worst group among all. A second kind of steady state is the one that predicts the 'end of racism' where lim
If a steady state like this is reached, then a process by which all agents will end up with the same atitude towards every ethnic group has taken place. We call these outcomes Integration Equilibria (IE). This equilibrium can be seen as the objective of integrationist policies. In this case, however, it does not happen that all groups merge in one single culture, but only that they do not discriminate among any culture. Every group, in fact, can continue to have its own cultural norms, and the society may continue to be formed by different cultural ways of life (since these cultural traits are not involved in this process), what converges here is just the attitutes groups reciprocally have. Thus, given our framework, this cannot be defined as a Melting Pot equilibirum. The second matrix represents this case. IE i j ... k i a a a a j a a a a ... a a a a k a a a a
We should underline that Hierarchy and Integration Equilibria are not good or bad states a-priori. With integration, in fact, we simply mean that all attitudes converge to the same value, so that it does not mean that these attitude should be good. It may happen that an IE is reached with very low final values, meaning that everyone has a bad attitude towards anyother, so that a very bad society is shown. On the reverse it can be that, in the first case, a ranking s shown but all the values are high, and thus represent very good attitudes. Thus, by the terms 'hierarchy' and 'integration', it is not meant any phenomenon with a specific positive or negative moral significance In some situations it may not be the case that the groups which is considered as the worst one, is also self-considered bad. In order to control for this problem we add two more cases to the matrices above, implying that a sort of ethnocentric scheme, as for example found in Berry (2006) and Berry and Kalin (1979, 1996) , may be considered. We can thus define Hierarchy Equilibria with Ethnocentrism (HEE) and Integration Equilibria with Ethnocentrism (IEE)(Suppose V ii t = E ∀t, i):
If we suppose that E = 1, then the attitude every ethnic group member has towards own ethnic group members is maximum. In this case an agreement on the attitude values holds, but everyone considers himself at the top of the ranking. The same may happen in the second case in which convergence of all attitudes towards the same value may happen, but still a form of ethnocentrism holds. In this last case, represented by the last matrix, every agent can only discriminate with his attitudes between members of his own groups and others out of the group.
Effect of Oblique Socialization Schemes
Given the previous definition of particular socialization schemes and steady states, we can now state the following:
Proposition 3. A sufficient condition in order to get:
• HE is that Emulation Rule holds;
• IE is that Reciprocity Rule holds;
• HEE is that Ethnocentrism Rule holds;
• IEE is that Reciprocity and Ethnocentrism Rule holds;
With the last proposition we obtain an interesting result since, starting from two rules (Reciprocity and Ethnocentrism) important in the attitude formation schemes and derived from social psychology literature, we are able to prove convergence to four categories of steady states significant for their social properties. In particular we obtain that both racism-free and non racism-free steady states may be obtained given some condition over the oblique socialization schemes so that we can also state that racism may be a result of factors internal in the children socialization process, indirectly implying that policies that modify these schemes may have important results in term of racism outcomes. In particular a change in socialization structures such as reciprocity, widely changes the final outcome dramatically. We thus give reason of the intuition of Boyd-Richerson about the importance of the analysis of the cultural transmission schemes for the analysis of the long run equilibrium of the society. Additionally, proposition 3 makes clear that, is oblique socialization rules are such that w ij ij > 0, ∀i, j parents do not play any role in the determination of the class of the long run equilibrium and convergence may happen without their contribution. However different socialization efforts will have an influence on the final levels. We will see, in the next section, that their presence may become important if a more general set of socialization rules is considered. better understand what goes on. We consider here 3 ethnic groups and c(τ i t ) = τ i 2 t as a simplest cost function satisfying the requirements of assumption 1. We then set up weights proportional to the population shares but since population shares do not change, this is just a way to give a rule for the socialization weights. Thus a socialization dynamics as in equation (4) holds. We consider an equal population distribution among ethnic groups. Weight matrices are reported in Appendix A for all the four cases. Moreover we set up E = 1 in order to get the idea that groups may consider themselves as the best ones in the case in which ethnocentrism holds. However since E refers to type entries that do not experience any dynamics, this value can be change accordingly to cases. The top-left simulation regards a HEE equilibrium: after a very short adjustment we have at the top all the V ii t , ∀i, while each horizontal line then represents the attitude towards a specific ethnic groups, so that an ethnic hierarchy rises. The graph below shows the same socialization rule, but without ethnocentrism, so that also reflexive attitudes converge to the common ranking values. The graphs on the right represent, on the top a IEE and on the bottom a simple IE. In the first one we see that all attitudes, but reflexive ones, converge to the same value, while in the second one reflexive attitudes too converge to the common value. It is interesting now to study if steady states classes are invariant under changes in the socialization schemes. In particular, assume that the steady state has been reached using the proper socialization scheme and that only the 4 socialization schemes previously defined may be used by agents.
Definition:
We say that an IE (resp. IEE, HE, HEE) is invariant under a change in the socialization scheme if the new equilibrium under the new scheme is an IE (resp. IEE, HE, HEE).
We can thus state the following:
Corollary 1: An IE is invariant under any change of socialization scheme, while a HEE is not invariant under any change of socialization scheme. An HE is invariant if ethnocentrism is added, while is not invariant if reciprocity is added. An IEE is invariant if reciprocity is removed and not invariant if ethnocentrism is removed.
Corollary 1 states that in this framework, once that an IE happened, no changes in the socialization process may alter the equilibrium class. On the contrary, if integration has not happened, then there is room for it to be reached if socialization schemes change appropriately. In particular, starting from a HEE, then any of HE, IEE, IE may be reached adding respectively reciprocity, removing ethnocentrism or doing both actions. If the starting situation is an HE, then by adding reciprocity an IE may be reached, while from IEE, by removing ethnocentrism an IE may be obtained. The reverse processes may not be done so that, once that integration is obtained, it is impossible to create segregation from it only by changing the model parametrization.
Until now we have shown sufficient conditions for convergence. With the next corollary we provide necessary conditions for convergence to the HE-HEE class of equilibria, if every agent of every ethnic group uses the same socialization scheme, that we call 'symmetric socialization scheme' :
Corollary 2: A Necessary condition for convergence to a HEE or HE with symmetric socialization schemes is that reciprocity does not enter in the socialization schemes.
Corollary 2 states that an ethnic hierarchy may be substained in the long run only if no reciprocity holds. This necessary condition may be of some relavance since, in some political talkings on immigration, reciprocity is viewed as a way to introduce incentive for the building of a good attitude world. Sometimes, the subtle justification for these action calls lie in the willingness of maintaining the present ethnic social ranking. With this framework we show that both these reasonings may be wrong since reciprocity is the principal scheme for allowing cross-dependence of cultural values and thus for integration, as defined here, does not imply a good-attitude world. On the other side reciprocity, if applied in this symmetric socialization scheme, is incompatible with the preservance of an ethnic social hierarchy.
Asymmetric Socialization Rules
In the previous propositions and corollaries we have analysed the cases in which every agent of every ethnic group follows the same socialization scheme, so that symmetric socialization rules are implied. In particular every ethnic group applies a reciprocity schemes towards any other groups, or no one does towards anyother. Moreover everyone is ethnocentric or no one is ethnocentric. Emulation Rule imposes that w kj ij > 0, ∀i, j, k, t so that all ethnic groups are considered in the process and every ethnic groups considers all the other groups in the socialization scheme. These cases, however, can limit the analysis since different ethnic groups may show different socialization schemes depending on various social situations, or simply for any reason that we can think causes heterogeneity in socialization schemes: in particular it can be that a given group i can consider j's cultural traits as relevant while k's traits as irrelevant and thus using an appropriate socialization scheme. We will now take into account this possible heterogeneity. However we continue to suppose that within each ethnic group, all the agents use the same socialization scheme. In order to analyse these situations, we introduce a notation borrowed from network theory. Suppose each V ij t is a node, and call U the set of all the nodes. Then, the directional link V Define now a sink the set
Thus a sink is a set of nodes such that there is no path from any of them to any node outside the sink. The sink may be composed either of only one node or of more than one 15 node. In the first case a node V ij t is a sink if and only if w ij ij = 1 since in this case any other w kw ij = 0 and thus no links are formed towards outside. In terms of our model this means that the attitude is not questioned, and thus no dynamics will be shouwn for this trait. As a consequence, if ethnocentrism applies then V ii t is a sink. In the case in which the sink is composed of multiple nodes, then they are strongly connected, meaning that if V ij t ∈ S, V nx t ∈ S ⇒ P nx ij = ∅. Moreover, taken any node not belonging to any sink, there should exist a path that connect it to a sink, otherwise it would belong to a sink itself. This means that if there is only one sink then there should exist a path from any element out of the sink to an element of the sink. With this framework we have that, depending on the relevance parameters, the structure of the network may differ but, given that they are time independent, the structure of the network does not change with time. We use this kind of setup since, on one side, there is a strong link between the network structure and the transition matrices we use for proving convergence sicne a matrix is irreducible if and only if the associated directed graph is strongly connected; on the other side networks may give a more intuitive view of the relationships between ethnic groups in attitudes formation schemes, and thus it will be easier to identify relationships among ethnic groups and oblique socialization structures. Moreover, in order to study steady state classes, there is no need to know the weights intensity, but just if they exists or not. In fact, proposition 3 states that if a given oblique socialization structure exists, then convergence to a particular steady state happens without regards to the the intensity of the single influences. Thus, we are interested in wether the links exist or not, rather than their intensities. In order to control for asymmetric socialization rules, we start relaxing a little bit the Emulation Rule as previously defined. In that case w Proposition 4 states that HE may be reached under a big variety of socialization structures as far as all the V ij t , ∀i, depend directly or indirectly from each others (this is the case in which the component is strongly connected) or there is one sink, so that every other depends on it. Moreover, since now oblique socialization rules do not ensure aciclyc matrix anymore, positive vertical socialization enters as a sufficient condition for convergence. Figure 2 gives some examples of these cases and in particular of strongly connected networks. What does this mean in terms of relationships among groups? The first implication is that is it not needed that every group has contacts with all the other groups or consider them reliable during the socialization process in order to have a hierarchy of attitudes. Consequently we can have convergence to a HE even if there are strong frictions in the contacts among groups. The idea is that it is not necessary to be in touch with group k in order to know and maybe take its values as ours. It could be enough to be in touch with group j that is in touch with group k so that, by means of j we can consider k values in our socialization process. Consider, for example, the first graph of figure 2. In this case i and k reciprocally get influenced and j and w do the same. However k and j are also reciprocally linked. These two ethncities thus can be considered as cultural bridges for ethnic groups that do not have contacts. Suppose for example that i and j are ethnicities that refuse to get influenced each other, while both of them have contacts with k. This may be the case for two conflictual ethnic minorities (i and j) and a majority (k). The role of the majority in this case is not to simply report to i the j's values and viceversa, but to incorporate these values in its values and, by this process, making them acceptable by the third ethnicity. i does not trust j, but trusts k so that j's values may become acceptable if proposed by k, after having internalized them through its socialization process. However, the case for these cultural bridges may only be one case. The second case reported by the graph is the one in which one ethnicity is considered as a cultural hub. Suppose that an ethnic group k, for its role in the society, is the most open ethnic group such that k children have contacts with all the other groups and gets 17 influenced by them and, also, all other groups' children get influenced by it. In this case the 'hub' k is a collector of all others' cultural values, it produces a synthesis and influences the others . In this way everyone gets everyothers' values by means of the cultural hub, so that the weight vector that k uses become crucial for the determination of the steady states values. The last case represented in figure 2 happens if there are 'cultural circles'. In this case no groups has a predominant role but it just processes a little part of the overall cultural values and it passes to other groups in a circle. This last cases also makes clear the role of vertical socialization in ensuring convergence. Suppose that a scheme as the one with a cultural circle holds. Suppone then that parents do not socialize at all their children so that τ i t = 0, ∀i, t, so that assumption 1 does not hold. Then in this case convergence does not happen since there are cyclic matrices and thus a fluctuation of cultural traits is shown, unless all the values happen to coincide at time 0. Until now we have analysed cases in which the network is strongly connected. Proposition 4, however, provides a wider range of possibilities, an particularly the case in which there is a sink. Figure 3 provides graphical examples for these cases. The top-left and the bottom cases represent two different ways of intending a sinks: the former one in which the sink is a single value, and the latter in which the sink is a set of values. The last case may happen if a new group (x in the graph) enters the society. Still, the society has a structure of interethnic relationships, and this structure may be independent from the newcomers, and may also remain unaffected by the come of x. Thus the old society structure forms a sink, and the new comers may somehow depend on it with links to some of the existing groups. On the other side, the first case may happen when there is one cultural model that is recognized by everyone. The model does not change in time and everyone depends directly, or by means of cultural bridges, on it.
Since cultural models are represented as sinks it is important to consider the following corollary directly derived from the proof of proposition 3:
Corollary 3: If there is one sink, then the cultural values converge to the convergence point of the sink. If there are multiple sinks then an HE may not be reached.
This corollary states that cultural models determine the long run path of the society. This same fact, however, may also describe what happens if multiple cultural models are in the society, as in the top-right example in figure 3. Since thare are two conflicting cultural models which do not cross influence, then HE may not be reached unless the cultural models have, by chance, the same value. So, if there exist more than one cultural model an HE may not be reached, since every group may consider each model with different intensities, and these weights determine the long run equilibrium of the cultural values. This means that if, for every ethnic attitude, more than one group does not question its values, then an HE may not be reached.
Until now we have analysed the case in which a HE may be reached. We can similarly consider the conditions for reaching a IE.
Proposition 5. A sufficient condition in order to have an IE is that
• Assumptions 1-2 and Oblique Socialization Stability holds This proposition is very similar to the one for HE with the difference that now all cultural values may be somehow linked each other. Until now, the instrument that makes this possible is Reciprocity. However, it is not needed that everyone uses reciprocty towards anyother in order to obtain an IE. Suppose, in fact, that every ethnic group uses a Emulation Rule (resp. Ethnocentrism Rule) so that a HE (resp. HEE) is reached. Suppose now that one group starts to use reciprocity towards any other group. Figure 4 provides a graphical example for this case.
In this case group k uses reciprocity towards anyother. As a result, the long run equilibrium will be an IE in which the final attitude of everyone towards anyother is given by the attitude that everyone had towards k at the beginning, since the set S = {V ij t , ∀i, t} is a sink. In this way, the role of reciprocity is much more clear: if reciprocity is used by an ethnicity everyone think is bad, then a bad attitude of everyone towards anyother may be a result. If, on the reverse, it is used by a well reputed ethnicity, then a long run equilibrium in which everyone have good attitudes towards other may be likely to be observed. Another interesting case happens when reciprocity chains are observed, meaning that each ethnic group uses reciprocity towards another one and a chain or a circle is observed, so that again an IE is reached. In the case for IE, as in the HE cases, the roles for cultural bridges and cultural hubs may be equally reproduced. Moreover, proposition 5 opens the rowad to different schemes of oblique socialization others that reciprocity such that, linking all nodes together, may be responsible for convergence to an IE. Until now we provided sufficient condition for convergence to the different classes of equilibria given asymmetric socialization rules. We study now the existence of some necessary conditions under this asymmetric socialization schemes framework. A condition for both hierarchy and integration classes of equilibria is the following:
Corollary 4: A Necessary condition for convergence to a HE and HEE is that all the sinks belonging to a given component converge to the same value. A Necessary condition for convergence to an IE and IEE, is that all the sinks converge to the same value.
This corollary states that if there are more cultural models influencing the same cultural traits, then an equilibrium belonging to one of the previous described classes may not been shown. In fact, every trait may be differently influenced by the multiple models and thus every trait converges to a different value. Now, if a multiplicity of different cultural models may be compatible with a convergence to a HE, since every component may have one different sink, on the contrary in order to have an IE it is necessary that all the cultural models of the society converge to the same value. Thus a multiplicity and diversity of cultural models may preclude long run integration equilibria. If, for example, 20 an ethnicity does not question two or more of its cultural values, that IE cannot be reached
The case for different integration paths: an example
We try now to apply this framework to a situation often studied in literature: why european minorities integrated faster in the US society while blacks did not? What follows is just a very simplified scheme of what happened and why, so that we only want to capture the main forces implied by the analysis of socialization schemes that operated in this process. In this sense it is useful to take what Ogbu (1990) found in his work. Ogbu studied long this problem and is considered one of the most important contributors to the theory of minorities. We take here his classification of minorities into voluntarily and involuntarily minorities. The first ones are minorities that arrive in a country as immigrants that want to gain a better life style, so that they are a-priori more prone towards the majority values. The second ones are groups forced to go in the US, conquered or enslaved. In terms of US history we may think at Blacks and, for different reasons, Natives and part of Hispanics. Consequently a group is considered as voluntary or not depending on its history. Ogbu then studied the different approaches of these groups to education and assimilation to the main culture. For sure we cannot make group history endogenous in this model, but we can analyse what is its effect on the long run, supposing that it only have effect on the Socialization schemes the agents would use. Thus, since the only factor history may have effect on in this model is oblique socialization structure, we try to capture this effect using the rules of Ethnocentrism and Reciprocity previously analysed. In order to make our model operative in this framework we consider the following socialization schemes belonging to the two minorities classes identfied by Ogbu (1990) , and the majority:
• Voluntary minority: Agents do not use reciprocity towards anyone and are only influenced by the majority values: if the majority consider the ethncity k a bad ethnicity, they tend to do so and to conform to majority attitudes. These people want to be more part of the values of the majority because, being immigrants, they think the society could give them a higher role. They thus think that discrimination is a temporary phenomenon, so that they are more prone to forgive it. Moreover they use ethnocentrism. We represent them here with the letter E, as European.
• Involutary minority: Agents just use reciprocity towards everyone: these people do not think that the majority has values compatible with theirs and, given their history of segregation, they tend to be suspiscious and to punish every discrimination they face. Since they feel unconfortable in the society they build bad attitudes towards people having bad attitudes towards them, and good attitude towards whom has good attitude towards them. Moreover they use ethnocentrism. We represent them here with the letter B, as Blacks.
• Majority: Agents act with reciprocity towards everyone: these people, being the historical majority of the country, think that their values are the best ones and are not prone to change them. They also sanction anyone has a bad attitude towards them and give a prize the good attitudes. Moreover they use ethnocentrism. We represent them here with the letter A, as Americans.
Note that the Involuntary Minority and the Majority basically apply the same rule, but for different reasons: the majority does not want to loose its primacy in values, and thus with reciprocity apply a penalty towards anyone that does not respect this primacy; on the contrary, by means of reciprocity, they rewards anyone who share their values contributing to maintain their primacy. Involuntary minorities, on the reverse, given that they face an adverse environment, they tend to be nice towards anyone who is nice to them, and mean towards who is mean as if it continues to perpetrate their inferior role in the society. Figure 5 represents these socialization rules in the network structure. The solid lines represent the weight structure as described above. Given this structure we have that, in the long run V AA = V AE = V AE . This means that, as we almost observed, European has been going to be considered very good by americans, due to the fact that they kept the values of americans and, for doing so, they had beed rewarded with better attitude, so that an almost full integration between these groups may be observed. Now, even european groups as italians, at first considered different from all the other northern european groups, are almost as integrated as other americas are.
On the other side we have that V BA = V AB = V EB = V BE . What drives this dynamic is the reciprocity rule that both Blacks and American apply each other. In term of network, these two values (V BA and V AB ) represent a sink. This means that, having begun with low attitudes each others, given the history of enslavery and discrimination, the long run equilibirum is a reciprocal bad attitude: in a very dichotomic and simplified way, blacks treat whites bad because has been treatad bad while whites treat them bad because they are treated bad, thus building a chain with no end. Then Europeans, in their integration willingness, took the american attitude in their formation scheme so that V EB → V AB . Morever, since blacks use reciprocity we also have that V BE = V EB . At the end blacks end up with the same attitude towards europeans and americans (so that europeans and american do not only consider themselves as integated each other, but are also perceived as integrated by blacks), so that they have bad attitude towards everyone and everyone have bad attitude towards them. Moreover, no one needed to change the reflexive attitude.
Had the situation could have evolved differently? Or, may the situation be changed in order to achieve an integration for blacks too? The dashed lines represent some alternatives in socialization schemes in order to reach a different steady state. The first theoretical possibility we consider is that V AB is influenced by V BB . In this way V BB represents a sink and thus there would be convergence towards a good attitude towars blacks: this socialization rule seems however unreasonable.
What if E consider B in their formation? Suppose to have immigrants, but not totally prone towards A: suppose then that the link V EA → V BA is built. In this case V EA would end up in a linear combination of V AA and V BA so that europeans would end up in between the two extremes. This, however, would not delete the bad attitude from and towards B. In the same time Europeans would consider Americans worst that before, and thus do americans with europeans. Suppose now the possibility that E work as cultural bridges so that B trusts them, even if very little: in this case the only sink would be V AA and a good attitude of everyone towards anyother would arise. This underlines the strong importance of these cultural bridges in prejudice formation. These would happen independently from the streght of the links, so that, for the long run outcome, it is more important the role of cultural bridge that the intensity of this role. All this analysis, however, is based on static weights exogenously given by some induction over the groups history, so that there could be space for deeper study of socialization rules with time dependent and endogenous weights.
Time-Dependent Oblique Socialization
Starting from equation (6) we have constrained the oblique socialization rule to be fixed along time. However, this may not be the case, since the society composition may change, and thus weights may change as well along time following different possible rules. We thus now study what happens if a more general specification of the cultural dynamics is taken into account, thus reconsidering the formulation in equation (5):
Assumption 3: (Symmetry) There is a symmetric oblique socialization rule if ∃T :
This assumption is satisfied if, at least after some point in time, if a cultural trait A directly influences cultural trait B, then the trait B influence also the trait A. Speaking with network language this means that all the links that exist in a network, after a period of time T have to be bidirectional. To notice that a direct consequence of this assumption is that every component of the derived directed graph is strongly connected.
Assumption 4: (Temporal Stability) There is a temporal stable oblique socialziation rule if ∃T : w kw T +t,ij = 0 ⇔ w kw T +t+1,ij = 0 or w kw T +t,ij = 0 ⇔ w kw T +t+1,ij = 0, ∀i, j, k, w, ∀t > 0.
Thus Oblique Socialization Stability is a property of weights such that, after some periods of time, the way in which ethnicities are influeced each others is stable. Namely, if i agents do not consider j agents, they continue with this scheme forever and if they consider them they continue in this way forever. As a direct consequence of this property w kw T +t,ij = 1 ⇔ w kw T +t+1,ij = 1 and w kw T +t,ij ∈ (0, 1) ⇔ w kw T +t+1,ij ∈ (0, 1). Moreover, if assumption 4 holds, then after time T the network structure is fixed. Thus, given these assumptions,t we can state the following: Last proposition states that if we set up any weights dynamics such that symmetry is satisfied and after a time T it is also stable, then convergence happens. An example for this happens if we consider a dynamics as the one represented in equation (4) that we report down here:
so that the socialization weights are represented by the population weights. As previously argued, this represents the most frictionless society we can imagine. Suppose then that the population dynamics is such that no group ever gets extinguished. Then we can state the following:
Corollary 5: If cultural dynamics is represented by equation (4) and no population ever get extinguished, then convergence to an IE occurs. Smirnov (2007, 2008) and Pichler (2008) found in their works, and shows how this is only one specific case that can be represented in this cultural evolution context. From a technical point of view, the second part of proposition 6 also extends the results of Smirnov (2007, 2008) , since we add sufficient conditions for convergence if the transition matrix cannot be rewritte as a block diagonal matrix with irreducible diagonal blocks, as shown in the proof of proposition 6. Then, we can also state the following more general sufficient condition for convergence to a HE:
Last corollary put into this context what
Corollary 6: If assumptions 1-2-3-4 hold, then, if at time T the network derived from the socialization weights has only one sink per component, then an HE occurs.
Last corollary states that, apart from the sufficient conditions for convergence, since assumption 4 implies time stability of network structure, the structure of the network at time T can indicate the class of steady state it will be reached.
Conclusion
Existing economic cultural evolution literature referring to Cavalli-Sforza and Boyd-Richerson studies, mainly focuses on what happens if time invariant cultural values are transmitted from one generation to the other (as in the contributions of Bisin and Verdier) and studies the evolution of population shares under this assumption. Only recently, some interest has been devoted to the study of convergence of non-fixed cultural values Smirnov (2007, 2008) and Pichler (2008) ). The more recent contributions studied the conditions under which a melting pot equilibrium happens in terms of long run equilibrium, finding that it may happen if there is a general cross influence among cultural values. They focus on a single cultural value and they study what happens in the long run Here, starting from the initial intuition of Boyd and Richerson (1985) about the importance of cultural transmission structures, we study what happens if attention is given to the different oblique socialization schemes. Using a framework in which there are ethnic groups and parents trying to transmit their attitudes towards the different groups, we are able to understand what happens if different interaction schemes among ethnicities are considered. Using schemes as Reciprocity and Ethnocentrism we prove that, if all agents use the same socialization scheme, then the society may converge both to integration both to a social hierarchy based on ethnicity, thus deriving equilibria consistent with empirical studies. We then analyse what happens if different ethnic groups use different socialization schemes. Using a network-derived framework we underline the role that different groups may have in the convergence process: a groups may play as cultural bridge, cultural hubs and if all groups have equal role, cultural cycles may arise. In this case, we also prove when it is possible to arrive at an integration equilibrum and when it is not possible. We then use this framework in order to get some insights on what happened in US with european and black minorities: why the first ones integrated while the second one experience much more difficulty? This framework thus gives an instrument in order to analyse why different minorities may end up with different long run integration equilibria. We do not provide yet an endogenous explanation of the different socialization schemes. Still we can understand what happens under different intergroup relation structures. We then provide the first steps for the endogeneization of socialization structures with some sufficient conditions a weights dynamics may satisfy in order to reach integration or segregation equilibria. This study opens new roads in which the reasearch may be run: there is space in order to understand what happens if the structure of the interethnic relationships change with time, so provding an endogeneization of socialization schemes. Similarly it would be interesting to study what happens if forms of socialization schemes other than reciprocity and ethnocentrism may be implemented. Again it could be interesting to analyse what happens if horizontal socializiation is taken into account into these schemes. An empirical analysis on some case studies may be important.
Appendix A. An Extension: Endogenous Oblique Socializations
IN the previous sectins we have shown how, given different weights structures, the society will end up with a particular type of steady state. However, if real societies are used, we should provide a criterion in order to decide which weight structure is more suitable to the analysis in order not to give it exogenously.
In equation (5) we provided a general dynamic for which any V ij t+1 could potentially depend on any V kw t . Here we consider simpler dynamics derived from the ones described by the 4 socialization rules previously defined. Dynamics in this context differ in relation to the structure of Oblique Socialization. In particular, given ethnicity i, oblique socialization crucially depends on what extent agents i trusts other ethnicities in making their judgments or how much the degree of similarity among them influences the attitude formation scheme. We thus consider the case in which the weights agents assign to other ethnicities' judgments only depend on a measure of similarity of values. In order to study this kind of endogeneity, we introduce the concept of Cultural Similarity, s ij , being a measure of how a given ethnicity i is close to another one j. This similarity will thus have an impact on the weights accordingly to the following basic rules:
These properties state that the weight is positive if and only if the similarity is positive so that two dissimilar groups do not interact in the attitude formation scheme. Then the weight is increasing in the similarity between the considered ethnicities. Note that w kj t,ij is independent from j so that w kj t,ij = w kn t,in = w kk t,ik and w ji t,ii = w jk t,ik so that ethnocentrism does not thold in this specification. How now to determine the similarity? The measure of the similarity can be done on proper sociological studies given the particular environment we would like the model to be applied to, but this is not the road we would take in this theoretical work. Thus, coherently with the model in which agents only cares about ethnicity, similar type vectors means that they show similar cultural values, thus we propose an endogenous similarity index.
This element is a measure of cultural values distance among ethnic groups. Define
• if ∆ ij ties have identical values, then their similarity has to be positive also in the case in which ∆ = 0. We call∆ Openness Propensity. In fact, for high levels of∆, the agents consider also far ethnicities in their socialization schemes, so that they are open towards big changes in their values. The opposite happens for low levels of∆. For the time being we have that all groups use the same similarity function and the threshold is not ethnic specific, thus we have that s
with k x k = 1 and 0 ≤ x k ≤ 1 ∀k, and where there is a group independent similarity function s(∆ ij t ), and a group independent parameter∆. This is the most simple cultural distance we can think about. In particular the distance between i and j is defined as a weighted mean of the absolute value of the differences of all their entries. Moreover we assume that all agents use the same similarity function and that they have the same openness propensity (we extend to heterogenous propesities later in this section). With this specification we have that s ij t = s ji t so that, taken two ethnic groups, they agree on the degree of similarity between them. We can now state the following propositions:
Proposition 7. If Basic Cultural Distance holds and reciprocity is not considered in any oblique socialization scheme ⇒ the generalized Cavalli-Sforza Socialization dynamics converges.
Proposition 8. If∆ = 1 or∆ = 0, given Basic Cultural Distance ⇒ any Generalized Cavalli-Sforza Socialization Dynamics converges.
Proof. See Appendix C. Proposition 9. If there are only two ethnic groups, then given Basic Cultural Distance ⇒ convergence happens.
We cannot provide a mathematical proof for convergence with reciprocity in socialization scheme, endogenous weights and also a generic number (n > 2) of ethnic groups. However we have run a big number of simulations with different intial values of any parameters and convergence always happened. Thus we have reasons to think that convergence happens also in this case under basic similarity. In particular reciprocity is such that at the first stages two dissimilar ethnicities belonging to two different submatrices may become similar, while, as before, a irreducible submatrix may be split in two. Consequently we had not found yet a way to prove oblique socialization stability, even though from simulations this happens after the first stages. Thus, a deeper mathematical analysis on this aspect is needed. 28
Last propositions and simulations state that if every couple of groups share the judgment over reciprocal similarity, so that they both feel dissimilar or similar each other, whatever the degree of this similarity, then convergence happens. In particular, if∆ is low, a hierarchy equilibrium is likely to be observed. Take, in fact, matrix B: every block consists of all values of all ethnic groups linked by a certain degree of similarity. In particular if s ik = 0 but s ij > 0 and s jk > 0 then the values of these three ethnic groups produce an irreducible block thus being a diagonal block in the B matrix. Then, as in the other hierarchy equilibria, every block converge to a different value, so that ethnic groups inside each block integrate among them. This means that, while in the previously studied case ethnic social ranking and reciprocity could not be shown together, this may happen here. In fact if w ji t,ij > 0 ⇒ V ij and V ji belong to he same diagonal block, thus they may converge to the same value. In the meanwhile different blocks converge to different long run values so that a ranking may rise. Moreover last propositions also states that it is not given that, if two groups are at time t on an integration pattern then they will integrate. Consider the case in which an irreducible submatrix is composed by two clusters of elements. In each cluster similarity among groups is high, but only few elements in each cluster are connected with elements of the other cluster with very low similarity. Then it can be that at the first steps each cluster would temporarily moves towards its mean. In this way there is the possiblity of breaking the links between the clusters so that two independent submatrices may rise. In this way every cluster will then converge to a different level. Last proposition thus makes us able to understand why minorities may follow dfferent integration patterns. Empirical evidence shows that european immigrants in US got integrated faster than other minorities. In this way we explain that this may had happened since values of european minorities were much closer to US ones than other ethnic groups. This had brought to higher similarity perception between european and US people, and thus to narrower linkages towards integration. These proposition also clarifies a new role for vertical socialization. Differently from the cases in which weights were exogenous, in this case there is no need of positive vertical socialization in order to get convergence. Vertical socialization had the role to make vales at t + 1 rooted at their counterpart at time t, so to avoid cyclic matrices. If, then, paramenters are endogenous, since self-similarity is always positive, then V ij t+1 = f (V ij t ) always happens. In fact, children may find own parents' values during oblique socialization as well, so that vertical socialization is not the only place in which this may happen. Thus, even if parents decide to produce a suboptimal effort level, convergence happens as well. For sure final level will be different. However we have that τ i t and w ij t,ij are substitutes since, if w ij t,ij is high, parents may decide to give up part of their effort since the same values may be tken by the children from the other forms of socialization. Let's now analyse the effect of the Openness Parameter∆: if it is very low we are in front of what we can identify as an exclusive similarity, meaning that agents are very demanding in terms of value similarity in order to consider others in their attitude formation scheme. An inclusive similarity, on the other hand, holds if the threshold is high so that agents are not so demanding in terms of similarity in order to question their own values and consider other's attitudes in their socialization process. In order to better understand the role if this parameter consider the matrices below that report an example. The first one represents the starting values, while the other three The simulations had been run for p i = 0.7 and p j = p k = 0.15 so that the difference in the evolution of same size minorities become clearer. As in the previous cases, fertility rates and transition probabilities are such that population vector is stable along time while
with n the number of groups, and w (k) is considered bad by te other two groups, while both minorities have a good attitude towards the majority. Now, ifs is high, agents are very conservatives meaning that they need a high degree of similarity in order to be influenced by others in their attitudes: this is what we call exclusive similarity. As a result no change is shown in the long run. This outcome can be considered similar to what it is usually called 'closed society'. In particular we observe that in this case contacts among agents of different groups are not useful in order to get a higher degree of integration. Thus, it is not enough to make two groups in touch in order to achieve at least a higher integration, if they cannot consider the other group's values in their own values formation process. Ifs is higher then groups begin to be influenced, and, as a result, some groups will share the same attitudes set (i and j in this case), while others (as k) do not change their attitudes. Only for low levels ofs we have generalized cross influence: this is what we call inclusive similarity. In particular an open society can be considered a one in which agents are prone towards diversity such that they consider even distant groups in their attitude formation scheme. This open society is the most likely to converge to integration outcomes. Thus interesting links between these similarity thresholds effects and the 'open society' of Popper can be analysed since, if thresholds are low, then the intergroup contamination and the questioning of parents' values is very likely to be similar to the critical thinking and tradition challenges Popper talked about. The case shown above also helps in the understanding of why even same size minorities may have very different integration patterns. In this case, both minorities have good attitude towards majority, but one of them (i) share with the majority the bad attitude towards the other. Then, if the society is not sufficiently opened, we observe the first two integrating and the misconsidered minority being out of any integration pattern. This numerical example makes us clear why cultural similar groups (i and j) may converge, thus having some insights on the fact that european minorities in the US integrate faster that other non-european groups. In fact if we suppose that European immigrant groups were much more similar to Wasp majority than Black, Asians or Hispanics (and this is reasonable since Wasp are derived from part of the european culture), we can reasonably understand this phenomenon. We should also add that this similarity measure is not entirely endogenous, so that it may take into account some other similarity measures. We can think that some aspect of culture, as religious beliefs, may play a role. Moreover, if we think at some peculiar historical aspects, as black slavery, this will play for sure a role in the patterns of different ethnic groups. We can thus think that black slavery had an impact on the initial values of the V . Thus, noting that this parameter is such a sensible element in the model, some extensions on how this may change, how it is influenced by institutions and how it can be part of a policy for integration becomes crucially important. In this framework another interesting insight is the possibility that the openness parameter is group dependent so taking values∆ i . This means that two ethnic groups may differ in their openess degree. Even though this threshold is considered here as exogenous, it can be a function of the socio-economic role of the group in the society. If the group is loosing position in the economic position scale, for example, it could be reasonable to observe lower levels of openess since a fear of loosing values may arise. On the other hand, if a group is experiencing a gain in socio-economic positions then agents may become more open for the opposite reason. Thus, depending on the thresholds levels and the initial similarity values, it could happen that s ij = s ji so that non symmetric socialization rules holds: this happens if the similarity is above the threshold for one group and below for the other 4 . In this way, depending on how the dynamics proceedes, some agent that do not consider others attitude at the beginnnig, if they become closer, may consider them, or the opposite may happen. Consider again the previous initial situation in which there is a majority i, and two minorities such that one of them, j, is similar to the majority, and the other one, k, that is less similar, while the degree of similarity between the minorities is very low. We analyse now the cases in which one of these groups, in turn, shows a high level of openess (s = 0.4), while the other two shows a high level of closeness (s = 0.8). The graphs below show the cases in which in turns, i, j, and k respectively have a low opennes parameter level, while the tables below show the equilibrium values. The first case represents the one in which the majority is open: we can identify two periods in the convergence. In the first one we have that one ethnic group does not feel similar to anyother and thus it has no contamination nor dynamics: this is the k group for the first 20 generations. After this period of time i agents (and j agents through i's influence) became closer such that now both j and k begin to include the others in the socialization scheme experiencing the convergence of the second period. This irregularity in convergence makes again clearer the role of this parameter in the understanding of short run cross-influences: having in fact a short run view over the dynamics it could be thought that k agents would never wanted to integrate in the society. It was then enough, in this case, to have one group (i) that uses inclusive similarity and is felt similar to a group using exclusive similarity (j) in order to create a bridge for long run integration. In this case, i agents have to be patient and waint for almost 20 generations before hving the first results of their openness: this gives the idea that integration processes may not be a matter of yearsbut o decades or more. The second case represents the situation in which the minority closer to the majority is open: then even though some influences from the k groups happen to be observed, in the long run i and j integrate almost perfectly, while the other minority group remains segregated. This also happens for a total open minority: in fact, since j agents are more similar to i than to k, then they will always take more care of i values that of k values, so that their mean will always be biased in favour of the firsts. Consequently it never happens that i and k become sufficiently close to be influenced each other. If, on the other hand, the most dissimilar minority is opened (as in the third case), then integration happens 32 since the ethnicity that was an obstacle for integration removes the closeness prejudice. These three simple numerical examples are just indicative of three phenomena that can happen during the integration process. We can thus capture the fact that we can observe strong changes in the integration process with groups that do not integrate until a given similarity level is reached, and other groups working as bridge-builders across ethncities. We can give reason of the fact that the most dissimilar group remains segregated even in the case in which other groups are opened towards it, since tighter links hold among most similar groups. As in the previous case, we run a great number of simulation with different values for the all the parameters involved in the dynamics and we have always observed convergence. Even though we are not able to provide a mathematical proof for this convergence, looking at the simulation that cover a wide range of possibilities, we are confident that convergence happens also for group specific openness levels. With this last part we make clear the effect that heteroegenous propensities towards openness may have on the final outcome. We are consciuos that these measures may be endogenous, but for the time being we consider them as dependent on something out of the model, and dependent on some socioeconomic position of the group, as previously argued. However these last results make clear the role that a policy focused on making people more open and tolerant may have on integration policies, since it comes clear that, besides material factors, these are crucial elements of the problem. Moreover, the endogenization of the socialization rule does not help in explaining why cycles may be observed, but drives us towards the direction of finding them into the changes of the socio-economic position of the groups, thus providing an exogenous explanation for these phenomena. On the other side, racism per se may be a results of the endogenous dynamics, if agents do no show a sufficiently high level of tolerance and openness. If weights are endogenized in order to depend both on similarity and population shares, and population dynamics shows cycles, then it can be that cycles in racism may be consequently observed.
Appendix B: Weights Matrices for Simulations
We report below the weight matrices we used in the simulations for figure 1. With respect to the cases reported in the definition of socialization rules we impose that w jj t,ij = 0, ∀i, j meaning that in forming ij attitude, i agents do not consider the reflexive attitude of j. This does not change the way in which dynamics happens, but just levels. In particular it avoids that in HEE and IEE everything converges to V = E = 1, as it is clear from proposition 4-5. Moreover we just write X where there is a positive weight. The weights are represented by the population shares so that, for example, w kj ij = p k . Since here population shares are constant, then the weight matrix is fixed.
HE ii ij ik ji jj jk ki kj kk 
in which every b ii is a square block, while some non-diagonal blocks may have all zero entries. Given time independent weights and τ i t ∈ (0, 1), the strucure of the B matrix is time invariant ∀t ≥ T . If B is a block-diagonal matrix then, since every diagonal block is irreducible and, by (*), acyclic, thenevery block convergs and thus overall convergence happens. If B is not a block diagonal matrix, take the b nn block. Again the structure of the matrix is time invariant. b nn converges since it is irreducible and acyclic.Take any V ij belonging to the b n−1,n−1 process. Then, we can always find weights α t , β t and γ t such that any element V ij t of this process can have its dynamic rewritten as
with α t ∈ (0, 1] (since τ i t > 0), β t ∈ + and γ t ∈ + in whichb n−1,n−1 is the value at which the elements of the b n−1,n−1 diagonal block had converged if the dynamics would have been given only by this diagonal block;b nn is the convergence points of the block b nn . Now, for cases for which w ij t,ij = 1 then α t = 1, β t = γ t = 0. Since weights are fixed, then this holds for all periods, so that these entries do not show any dynamics. Consider now entries with w ij t,ij = 1, ∀i, j. In this case we can find α t ∈ (0, 1), β t ∈ + and γ t ∈ + .
Define α t ! ≡ t i=0 α i . We can write:
In order to analyse the convergence we should look at lim Consider now the termb n−1,n−1 t i=1 β i α t ! α i ! and call z j = β j αt! αj ! . j = t ⇒ z j = β t j = t − 1 ⇒ z j = β t−1 α t j = t − 2 ⇒ z j = β t−2 α t α t−1 j = t − 3 ⇒ z j = β t−3 α t α t−1 α t−2 ... j = t − t + 1 ⇒ z j = β t−t+1 α t α t−1 α t−2 ...α t−t+2 takeβ = max{β t } andᾱ = max{α t } then β j α t ! α j ! is an increasing sequence bounded above by a converging sequence, so that it converges.
The same proof holds forb nn t−1 j=0 γ j+1 α t ! α j+1 ! .
Thus lim t→∞ V ij t is a finite sum of converging series so that it converges too. Thus the elements of the (n − 1, n − 1) block converge. If we recursively apply this reasoning to all the other blocks until we reach the (b 11 ) block, then convergence is proved.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. A system like V t+1 = AV t converges if each diagonal block of the transmission matrix is acyclic and the derived digraph is strongly connected. In all cases, socialization rules imply w ij ij > 0, ∀i, j, such that all the diagonal blocks of the transmission matrix are acyclic. If Emulation Rule holds, we have that all the elements V ij ∀i form a single fully connected component, so that it is also strongly connected, thus the matrix associated with the digraph is irreducible. Thus, by Smirnov (2007, 2008) , convergence to a common value for each component, and thus to a HE, happens. This can also be seen by the fact that the mastrix is diagonal and symmetric and thus can be transformed into a block diagonal matrix in which every block is irreducible and thus converges. The Reciprocity rule differs from the previous one since each component is connected to the other ones since there are the double links between V ij and V ji ∀i, j, so that all V ij ∀i, j forms a single strongly connected digraph and, for the same reason as before, convergence to a IE happens. The Ethnocentrism Rule and Reciprocity and Ethnocentrism rule differ from the previous ones in the sense that V ii = E ∀i such that each of these reflexive elements forms a component per se and do not show any dynamics. The remaining elements have a structure as in the previous two cases thus convergence respectlivey to HEE and IEE happens.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Each component forms a dynamics system per se and thus may be considered separately from the others. Consider first the case in which the elements of a group are strongly connected. Then the transmission matrix may be represented as a block diagonal matrix in which each block is irreducible and thus convergence happens. If there is one sink then it can be represented as a upper triangular block matrix in which the sink is the right-bottom block. From proposition 2 in this case convergence holds too. In order to prove that all th elements of the same component converge to the same value, consider first the case in which the sink is only one node. Then the weight matrix is represented as follows: so that X t+1 = B t X t = B t X 0 . In terms of Markov processes, this can be identified as a NonHomogenous single-unireducible Markov Process. Given the structure of our process, the limit probability of the markov process represented by the transmission matrix represents the limit of matrix of weights. Consequently if the limit probability of the markiv process exist, then the process converges, and if the limit probaility can be identified, then the limit of the matrix of weights can be identified. D'amico et al. (2009) so that convergence to the sink level happens. Consider now the case that the sink is composed of more that one element. Since all the nodes of the sink are strongly connected, then they converge to the same value I. Consequently we have that (for the case of a two-nodes sink, but it can be extended to a n-nodes sink case): 
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Since all elements forms a single component the proof for convergence is the same as the one for convergence of each component in proposition 4
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Suppose that ethnocentrism does not hold. If assumptions 3 and 4 hold then the matrix is always compoes of only one irreducible component. By assumption 1 this is also acyclic, so that, by Smirnov (2007, 2008) convergence happens. If ethnocentrism hold, then the symmetric traits V ii , ∀i are fixed, while all the weights for the other traits form a single irreducible component and thus convergence happens.
We prove now the second part of the proposition. If assumption 4 holds, then the matrix structure is stable. Each component forms a dynamics system per se and thus may be considered separately from the others. Consider first the case in which the elements of a group are strongly connected at time T, so that they will always be strongly connected. Then the transmission matrix may be represented as a block diagonal matrix in which each block is irreducible and thus, by Smirnov (2007, 2008) convergence happens. If there is one sink then the matrix can be represented as a upper triangular block matrix in which the sink is the right-bottom block. Consequently the proof follows as the one for proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Since Basic Cultural Distance holds, then s Moreover since s ii t > 0 ⇒ w ij t,ij > 0 ∀i, j, t, so that all diagonal elements are positive, so that any diagonal block is acyclic. In order to prove convergence we should prove that ∃T such that the matrix structure is fixed ∀t ≥ T . Consider time t + 1. Two diagonal independent blocks at time t cannot form a unique irreducible diagonal block at t + 1. In order to prove this, call n i a generic element of block N and
